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ABSTRACT

In the era of context-aware services, users are enjoying remarkable services based on data
collected from a multitude of users. To receive services, they are at risk of leaking private
information from adversaries possibly eavesdropping on the data and/or the un–trusted
service platform selling off its data. Malicious adversaries may use leaked information to
violate users’ privacy in unpredictable ways. To protect users’ privacy, many algorithms
are proposed to protect users’ sensitive information by adding noise, thus causing contextaware service quality loss. Game theory has been utilized as a powerful tool to balance
the tradeoff between privacy protection level and service quality. However, most of the
existing schemes fail to depict the mutual relationship between any two parties involved: user,
platform, and adversary. There is also an oversight to formulate the interaction occurring
between multiple users, as well as the interaction between any two attributes. To solve
these issues, this dissertation firstly proposes a three-party game framework to formulate

the mutual interaction between three parties and study the optimal privacy protection level
for context-aware services, thus optimize the service quality. Next, this dissertation extends
the framework to a multi-user scenario and proposes a two-layer three-party game framework.
This makes the proposed framework more realistic by further exploring the interaction, not
only between different parties, but also between users. Finally, we focus on analyzing the
impact of long-term time-serial data and the active actions of the platform and adversary.
To achieve this objective, we design a three-party Stackelberg game model to help the user
to decide whether to update information and the granularity of updated information.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

People are enjoying a huge convenience from context-aware services, such as navigation
services provided by Google Map, reviews and recommendations services provided by Yelp,
ride-sharing services by Uber and Lyft, online social media services provided by Facebook,
etc. However, people are suffering from privacy leakage while enjoying these convenient services. According to the statistics from [1], 55% of iOS applications and 59.7% of Android
applications surreptitiously leak user’s data. In recent news, we learned of Facebook improperly sharing data that impacted 87 million users [2] and Equifax [3] compromised private
information of 143 million users.
This has led to considerable research on techniques to protect a user’s private data from
being leaked and/or sold. Most of the privacy protection algorithms, e.g. k-anonymity [4],
l-diversity [5], t-closeness [6], and differential privacy [7], protect the data by adding noise.
However, the added noise in existing work will decrease the quality of provided services [8].
To maximize the service quality while satisfying the privacy protection demands, researchers
made the efforts on two aspects: (i) optimizing the privacy protection algorithm to maintain
as much usable information under the privacy protection restriction, and (ii) utilizing Game
Theory to find the optimized privacy protection setting for the algorithms by balancing
privacy loss and service quality. However, each aspect has its drawbacks.
Current k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness based algorithms suffer from differential
attack [9]. In October 2006, Netflix, the worlds largest online Digital Versatile Disc (DVD)
rental service, publicly released a data set containing 100 million anonymized movie ratings, created by 500,000 users of Netflix. Narayanan and Shmatikov demonstrated that an
adversary could identify the users information with less background knowledge about individual users. They revealed the users sensitive information by using IMDb as the source
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of the background knowledge [10]. Differential Privacy based algorithms can prevent users
from differential attacks [11]. The limitation of Differential Privacy based algorithm is that
it cannot be used in the scenario with only one user. To solve this problem, [12] mixed
differential privacy and k-anonymity proposed a perturbation method based on local enforcement of differential privacy. However, both k-Anonymity and differential privacy will
lead to unavoidable inaccurate service.
To maximize the service quality in the privacy protected context-aware services, many
researchers utilize Game Theory to find the best privacy protection level setting by balancing
the tradeoff between privacy loss and service quality. Most of the existing game theory
based work investigates the interaction between two parties: user/data owner and adversary.
In [13–18], games are based on a two-player model, i.e., one-against-one. When there are
multiple users trying to maintain a certain privacy preserving level, the user-adversary game
can be modeled as an n-player game [19–24], but with the drawback that all users must
have the same settings. Another drawback is that the two-party game cannot depict the
interactions among three antithetic parties. Recently, three-party game models have been
proposed to study complicated privacy issues among user/data owner, service provider/data
requester, and adversary. In [25], Li et. al. designed a hierarchical game, incorporating
a user-service provider game and a user-attacker game, to maximize the service provider’s
utility while assisting the user in defending the attacker. Adl et. al. [26] proposed a threeparty sequential game to analyze the interactions among a data provider, a data collector, and
a data user (i.e., the adversary), which can guide the data provider and the data collector to
find the optimal strategies deciding whether to cooperate with the data user. In [27,28], Wang
et. al. studied the interactions among a user, an application, and an adversary to answer two
questions: whether the user should submit data and whether the application should resell
the user’s data? To resolve the trade-off between sharing advantages and privacy exposure
of cybersecurity information exchange system, Vakilinia et. al. [29] designed a three-party
game for privacy-preserving cybersecurity information exchange framework consisting of an
attacker, an organization, and a cybersecurity information exchange system. However, the
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three-party games in [25–29] fail to build the mutual interaction between any two of the three
parties, and the strategy of each party in [26–28] is coarse-grained, or binary, by indicating
“whether to cooperate with opponents or not”.
These drawbacks and challenges have not been properly solved. Contrasting from the
existing work, we establish our research by proposing a three-party game model to capture
the mutual interaction between any two of the three antithetic parties (including user/data
owner, service provider/data requester, and adversary) and aim to identify their strategies
on “how to defend (or cooperate with) others”, which can offer fine-grained guidance to the
three parties. The main contribution of each part includes:
In the first part, we design a privacy-preserving game to quantify the three parties’
concerns and capture interactions between any two of them. We also identify the best
strategy for each party at a fine-grained level, i.e. specific settings, not simply binary. Via
both theoretical analysis and real-data experiments, the performance of our proposed game
model is validated.
In the second part, we propose a platform-centric two-layer three-party game model to
protect the users’ privacy and provide quality of service. One layer focuses on the interactions
among the multiple asymmetric users and the second layer considers the influence between
any two of the three parties (user, platform, and adversary). We prove that the Nash
Equilibrium exists in the proposed game and find the optimal strategy for the platform
to provide quality service, while protecting private data, along with interactions with the
adversary. Using real datasets, we present simulations to validate our theoretical analysis.
The third part analyzes the influence of time-serial data and the possible feedback from
a platform with diverse reward for data according to the feedback in three-party game based
framework. This work enhances the three-party game based framework by making it more
realistic, thus providing more practical application scenario.
The rest of this dissertation proposal is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes
the related literature. Chapter 3 studies the problem of “Privacy Protection among Three
Antithetic-Party for Context-Aware Services”. This work has been submitted to the 39th

4
IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019). Chapter 4 “Privacy Protection for Context-Aware Services: A Two-Layer Three-Party Game
Model” expands the work in Chapter 3. This work has been accepted by the 14th International conference on algorithms, systems, and applications of wireless networks (WASA
2019). In chapter 5, we introduce game theory based privacy protection for context-aware
services with the long-term time series data. Finally, in Chapter 6, we provide future direction and Chapter 7 concludes our work.
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Chapter 2

BACKGROUND

Context-aware services has been protected by privacy protection techniques [30–38].
Game Theory is a popular and efficient tool to find out the optimal privacy protection level
for the purpose of improve service quality under the protection algorithms. In this section,
we survey existing privacy protection level selection based on game theory .

2.1

Two Parties Game model
Two-party game models have two categories: single user centric game model and user

group centric game model.
Single user centric game models provide optimal local privacy protection strategy locally
by the user. Chorppath and Alpcan [13] propose a game theoretic approach to formulate
the interaction between users and companies for mobile commerce. In their game model,
users report their locations with granularity to protect privacy. The proposed game is utilized to find the optimal anonymity level for mobile users and the optimal incentive strategy
for companies. To balance the service data quality and location privacy preservation in
location-based services (LBSs), Shokri [14] et. al. propose a methodology to utilize Stackelberg Bayesian game to enable a designer to find the optimal location-privacy preserving
mechanism (LPPM). Given the service quality constraint of the user, the optimal LPPM
can provide the best privacy protection. Shokri et. al. improve their work by taking location correlation into account to protect the trajectory privacy of users [16]. The authors
use zero-sum Stackelberg Bayesian game to find the optimal LPPM to against adversary
subject to a service quality constraint. Sfar et. al. [17] propose a privacy preserving model
for retail applications. They utilize a Markov game model to reach a compromise between
privacy concessions of users and incentive motivations of data requester. To preserve privacy
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on mobile phone, Wang and Zhang [39] construct a zero-sum stochastic game to formulate
the strategic and dynamic competition between a smart phone user and a malicious adversary. According to the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game, the user can find the optimal
defense strategy. The users in single user centric game can achieve the privacy protection
by themselves. They do not need to consider the affection from other users and do not need
to corporate with other users. However, single user centric game models cannot provide
theoretical privacy protection guarantees like k-anonymization and differential privacy.

2.2

User Group centric Game Model
A group user based game model needs users in the group working together to maintain

a certain anonymization level.
Halkidi and Koutsipoulos [40] propose a game theoretic framework data privacy preservation in recommender systems. In the recommender system, the quality of recommendations depends on the submitted data from all users. Each user prefers to submit less data
to preserve data privacy. However, the quality of recommendation will decay if all the users
choose to reveal less information to the platform. In [40], the authors propose a game based
framework to balance the trade-off between privacy preservation and quality of recommendation. The Nash Equilibrium Point of the proposed game provides the optimal strategy for
each user. Wu et. al. [19] utilize game theory to balance the trade-off between privacy and
utility for correlated data publication. They find out the payoff of each user is dependent
on both its parameters and its neighbors’ privacy parameters. Therefore, they build a game
model of multiple players to analyze the optimal privacy parameters of data publication of
each user. When a user employs k-Anonymity in LBS, it needs to generate fake location
records, known as dummy users, to protection its location privacy. However, due to the high
cost of dummy user generation, self-interested users do not want generate dummy users but
free-ride on other’s efforts. Liu et. al [20] propose a distributed approach to guide users to
generate dummies according to their privacy demands and utilize Bayesian game model to
balance the cost of dummies generation and privacy protection and find the optimal dummy
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user generation strategy. To protect the pseudonyms used for authentication in mobile networks, users in a mix zone should collectively change their pseudonyms. A Sef-interested
user may not cooperate due to the high cost of pseudonym change. Freudiger et. al. [21]
define a game theoretical model to help each user in a mix zone to find the optimal time to
change their pseudonym by balancing the privacy protection and cost of pseudonym change.
Kumari and Chakravarthy [41] propose a Cooperative Game to achieve privacy preserving
before data publishing. The proposed game can incentivize users to stay in the coalition to
achieve k-anonymity. By using the optimal strategy from Nash Equilibrium, each user can
preserve its privacy and also contribute to preserving privacy of other users.
The user group centric game model is utilized to find the optimal strategy of each user
or incentivize users to stay in the group. Users in the group can have theoretical privacy
protection guarantee. However, they need to consider the interaction between users and need
a scheme to ensure all the users in the group are honest.

2.3

Three Parties Game Model
Most existing research only discusses the interaction between two parties: users and

adversaries or user and platforms (or service providers). However, privacy issues include
three parties: user, platform and adversary.
Adl et. al [26] analyze the trade-off between privacy and utility among three parties:
data provider (user), data collector (platform) and data user (adversary). They utilize a
sequential game to formulate the action of each party. In their game model, they assume the
data user is the leader of the game and can choose the privacy parameter. Data collector
and data provider has binary strategy: accept or reject. Obviously, their assumption is not
suitable in the real world. Wang et. al. [27] investigate the interaction between three parties:
user, application and adversary. They utilize a game model to find out the condition that can
make the three parties have good behavior. However, in their game model, the three parties
have only binary strategies. In another work of Wang et. al [28], they build a application
ecosystem based on quantum game model. The proposed application ecosystem contains

8
three parties: user, application and adversary. However, as the game model in [27], each
party only has two states: cooperation state and defection state. The simple strategy space
of each party is unpractical in a real scenario.
We build a three-party game model in this dissertation. The strategy of each party is
formulated according to their practical actions. Therefore, the proposed model in this paper
is more comprehensive and practical than existing works.
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Chapter 3

PRIVACY PROTECTION AMONG THREE ANTITHETIC-PARTY FOR
CONTEXT-AWARE SERVICES

In this chapter, we study the issues in existing game theory based research on privacy
protection for context-aware services and propose a three party game model based framework
to solve these issues.

3.1

Motivation
In the past years, privacy-preserving mechanisms have received a lot of attention from re-

searchers. Besides cryptography, game theory has been widely applied as a strategic methodology to search for optimal strategies balancing the trade-off between the benefit of sharing
data and cost of privacy disclosure [13–17, 19–29, 42, 43]. Notice that most of the existing
research only focuses on the interaction between two opposite parties [13–17, 19–21], i.e.,
defender-attacker game model. In [25–29], various three-party game models are proposed.
But, the game models of [25–29] are not “real” three-party models because they fail to depict the interaction between any two of the three parties, i.e. they considered either data
resale by the platform or attacks by the adversary. Additionally, the schemes in [26–28] only
provide a binary solution, specifically whether or not the user should submit their data to
receive services.
Further exploring the mutual relationships among user, platform, and adversary would
be more helpful for the user to defend against both the untrusted platform and the adversary.
Moreover, it would be beneficial to produce a more fine-grained solution, so that a user could
possibly provide obscured data and still receive adequate service. For this purpose, this
chapter aims to design a three-party game model among the three antithetic parties for users
to simultaneously protect their privacy from untrusted service platforms and adversaries.

10

Data resale
Detection

Payment
Adversary

Eavesdropping

Personal data
Service
User

Platform

Figure 3.1. Structure of thee-party game.

Such a realistic and complicated game model challenges us in the following aspects: (i)
Complicated game structure. As shown in Fig. 3.1, the interaction occurs between any two
of the three parties, increasing difficulty in addressing the three parties’ individual concerns –
how does the user assess the potential risk of privacy loss and determine the granularity when
submitting personal data; how does the platform determine data resale with consideration of
the risk of reputation loss; and how does the adversary make a choice between purchase and
eavesdropping? (ii) Joint threats. In such a complicated game, the user has to defend the
joint threats from both the platform and the adversary, which may be hard to accomplish.
(iii) Multiple data attributes. For many services, it is common that users need to submit
multiple data attributes that could be correlated together. Any obscurity applied to one
attribute would need to be correlated accordingly. (iv) Theoretical analysis & solution.
Designing, analyzing, and solving the proposed three-party game are destined to be difficult
due to the complexity of the game structure and correlated data attributes.
Our research endeavor to overcome the above challenges is briefly introduced as follows.
Firstly, in our game model, we link the three parties elaborately quantifying their concerns
and mutual interactions such that they are inseparable. Secondly, based on our game model,
we perform a theoretical analysis to rigorously prove the optimal strategies of the three
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parties, including the optimal data release granularity for the user, the optimal data resale
strategy for the platform, and the optimal probability to purchase data (or launch attack)
for the adversary. Finally, we conduct simulations with real datasets under various settings
to validate the effectiveness of our proposed game model.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide a fine-grained analysis on the
behaviors and interactions for the user, platform, and adversary with considering resistance
to the joint threats. Our major contributions are summarized as below:
• A three-party game is designed to capture the complicated interactions among user,
platform, and adversary targeting defending the joint threats from both untrusted
platform and adversary.
• An in-depth theoretical analysis is presented to identify the best strategy of each party.
• Comprehensive simulations with real datasets are exploited to evaluate the performance
of our game model, regarding optimal strategy, cost, and utility of the three parties.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Our game model is introduced in
Section 3.2. The optimal strategy of each party and the performance of our game are
analyzed in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4, respectively. Finally, Section 3.5 briefly concludes
this chapter and discusses our future work.

3.2

Three-Party Game Model
In this section, the interaction among user, platform, and adversary is modeled as a

three-party game, in which their strategies, benefits, and costs are mathematically formulated.
3.2.1

User Model

We consider the following scenario: a user submits personal dataset, denoted by D =
{d1 , d2 , ..., dn }, to a platform to acquire data-based service, where the dataset could contain
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one or more attributes and di (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is the data of attribute i. Due to privacy concerns,
the user may report data attributes with different data release granularity. Formally, the
data release granularity of attribute i is defined as gi ∈ [0, 1], and the corresponding data
granularity set is G = {g1 , g2 , . . . , gi , . . . , gn }. Specifically, with a larger gi , the data of
attribute i is less obscured, revealing more personal/sensitive information; for examples,
gi = 0 if di does not contain any personal data, and gi = 1 if di is fully accurate. In this
chapter, we use data granularity as a measurement of data quality/obscurity.
As the data release granularity increases, the quality of user’s requested service is increased with diminishing marginal benefit [44]. Suppose that the quality of attribute i-based
service can achieve a maximum value qi when gi = 1. Then, the relationship between the
quality of attribute i-based service and data release granularity gi can be formulated to be
2qi gi − qi (gi )2 . In addition, any two data attributes may correlate with each other, and such
correlation can be exploited to infer more sensitive information [45,46]. Let eij represent the
correlation between attribute i and attribute j. Due to correlations among data attributes,
the data of attribute i not only contributes to the quality of attribute i-based service, but
also contributes to the quality of attribute j-based service. Thus, given the user’s dataset
D, data release granularity set G, and data correlation {eij }, the overall service quality can
be estimated as follows.
n
X
i=1


1 +

n
X



eij gj  2qi gi − qi (gi )2 .

(3.1)

j=1,j6=i

While enjoying the service provided by the platform, privacy leakage incurred by data
submission brings privacy loss to the user. One possible method for this privacy loss could
be due to a malicious attack by an adversary that eavesdrops on the data submitted by
the user. In real-world scenarios, the working efficiency of information retrieval is restricted
by many factors, such as equipment performance and retrieval technique. The working
efficiency of eavesdropping at the adversary side is denoted by φ ∈ [0, 1], so the granularity
of eavesdropped data is φgi . Assume the adversary purchases data from the platform with
probability b and the probability of eavesdropping is 1 − b. Then, the expected cost due to
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eavesdropping of dataset D is defined as
(1 − b)

n
X

ci φgi ,

i=1

where ci is the unit privacy cost when gi = 1.
Another possible method for privacy loss could be that the user’s submitted data is
resold by the platform to a third-party (e.g., adversary) for more profit. We define the set of
platform’s resale strategy as S = {s1 , s2 , ..., sn }, where si ∈ [0, 1] and si gi is the resold data
granularity of attribute i. The platform does not resell di if si = 0 but resells all collected di
if si = 1. The expected privacy cost due to data resale at the platform side can be computed
by
b

n
X

ci s i g i .

i=1

By combining the received service quality and the experienced privacy cost, the user’s
utility can be calculated in Eq. (3.2).
Uu =λ

n
X
i=1


1 +

n
X



n
n
X
X

2

eij gj
2qi gi − qi (gi ) − (1 − b)
ci φgi − b
ci si gi ,
i=1

j=1,j6=i

(3.2)

i=1

where λ is the convention rate between service quality and privacy cost, i.e., one unit of
privacy cost is equivalent to λ units of service quality loss. Moreover, λ is also used to
measure the user’s privacy preference; that is, the user would care more about privacy cost
than service quality if λ is large, and the service quality outweighs the privacy cost if λ is
small.
In our proposed three-party game, the user aims to maximize its utility by balancing
the trade-off between service quality and privacy cost by strategically setting the granularity
set G. Accordingly, the optimization problem at the user side is
max Uu ,
G

s.t. gi ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ [1, n].

3.2.2

Platform Model

The platform provides users with requested services based on their submitted data. For
instance, Google provides navigation service to users based on their input location.
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While providing service to the user, the platform has its private valuation, defined to
be Vp , for the collected data from the user. With user’s data, the platform can obtain profit
from data-based production, such as data statistic analysis and new product development.
From the viewpoint that data is a type of potential productivity, the value of data can be
computed according to the standard form of Cobb-Douglas production function [47] as
n
X

θp

!ζp
gi

,

i=1

where θp is the total value productivity of the platform, and ζp ∈ (0, 1) is the platform’s
value output elasticities of G.
To get extra benefits, the platform may resell the collected data to a third party (i.e.,
the adversary) [48, 49]. Assume that pi is the unit data price of attributes i with gi = 1, so
the expected payment received from the adversary is
b

n
X

pi si gi ,

(3.3)

i=1

in which b is the adversary’s purchase probability and si represents the platform’s resale
strategy.
However, reselling the user’s data may cause the risk of reputation loss at the user side
and/or in public. According to the instantaneous risk function [50, 51], we can define the
risk of reputation loss due to data resale of attribute i as
l1 si gi + l2 (si gi )2 ,
where l1 and l2 are constant parameters of the risk estimation function. Since there may
exist a correlation between two data attributes [52], the adversary can infer more personal/sensitive information from one data attribute to another, leading to an increase in
the reputation loss at the platform side. Accordingly, the risk of reputation loss can be
estimated as

n
X
i=1

1+

n
X
j=1,j6=i

!
eij sj gj


l1 si gi + l2 (si gi )2 .

15
In addition, there exists a data processing cost cp at the platform side. Since the data
processing cost may be determined by the processing technology, which is out of the scope
of this chapter, we assume cp is a system parameter for simplicity. Therefore, the platform’s
utility, denoted by Up , can be defined to be
Up =b

n
X
i=1

pi si gi + θp

n
X

!ζp
− cp −

gi

i=1

n
X
i=1


1 +



n
X



eij sj gj  l1 si gi + l2 (si gi )2 .

(3.4)

j=1,j6=i

One can see that the platform faces a struggle between benefit and reputation cost from
data resale. More specifically, reselling more accurate data can enhance the profit while
damaging reputation, but reselling less accurate data can reduce reputation loss while losing
attractiveness of data resale. Thus, to improve utility via balancing the trade-off between
benefit and cost, the platform needs to choose a proper resale strategy S. Formally, the
optimization problem of the platform is formulated as
max Up ,
S

s.t. si ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ [1, n].

3.2.3

Adversary Model

To retrieve the user’s private information, the adversary could purchase data from the
platform with probability b or eavesdrop on the communication between the user and the
platform with probability 1 − b. With respect to each data attribute i, the granularity of
purchased data is si gi , and that of the eavesdropped data is φgi .
The adversary also has private valuation for the obtained data. With the analysis similar
to that in Section 3.2.2, we can utilize Cobb-Douglas production function [47] to compute
adversary’s private valuation as
bθa

n
X
i=1

ζa

(si gi ) + (1 − b)θa

n
X

(φgi )ζa ,

i=1

where θa is the data productivity of the adversary and ζa ∈ (0, 1) is the adversary’s value
output elasticities of data.
We suppose that the adversary can obtain all the data in D through eavesdropping at a
cost (e.g., equipment and time) that can be quantified by a quadratic cost function [53, 54],
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i.e.,
σ1 (1 − b)2 + σ2 (1 − b) + σ3 ,
where σ1 > 0, σ2 ≥ 0, and σ3 ≥ 0 are constant parameters of the quadratic cost function.
Note that when the adversary does not eavesdrop, there still is a cost because it needs to
purchase equipment and resources for eavesdropping. If the adversary chooses to purchase
data from the platform, the expected payment paid to the platform is formulated in Eq. (3.3).
To sum up, the utility of the adversary, denoted by Ua , can be computed to be
Ua =bθa

n
X

!ζa
si gi

+ (1 − b)θa

i=1

n
X

!ζa
−b

φgi

i=1

n
X


pi si gi − σ1 (1 − b)2 + σ2 (1 − b) + σ3 .

i=1

(3.5)

In the three-party game, the adversary faces the trade-off between data purchase and
data eavesdropping, i.e., the probability to purchase/eavesdrop data. Therefore, to improve
utility, the adversary has to choose a proper purchase probability b to maximize its utility,
which can be formulated as the following optimization problem.
max Ua ,
b

s.t. b ∈ [0, 1].

3.3

Nash Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we conduct in-depth theoretical analysis of the three parties’ strategies

and the relationships among their strategies.
3.3.1

Nash Equilibrium

In game theory, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile E ∗ with the property that no
party can unilaterally do better by choosing an action different from E ∗ , given that other
parties adhere to E ∗ [53]. Accordingly, the Nash equilibrium of our proposed three-party
game can be defined in the following Definition.
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Definition 1. A strategy profile E ∗ = (G∗ , S ∗ , b∗ ) is called Nash Equilibrium for the proposed
three-party game if the following properties simultaneously hold:
Uu (G∗ , S ∗ , b∗ ) ≥ Uu (G, S ∗ , b∗ );
Up (G∗ , S ∗ , b∗ ) ≥ Up (G∗ , S , b∗ );
Ua (G∗ , S ∗ , b∗ ) ≥ Ua (G∗ , S ∗ , b).

3.3.2

Strategy Analysis of User

To solve the optimization problem of the user, we analyze the concavity of its utility function. The first-order partial derivative and the second-order partial derivatives of
Eq. (3.2) are obtained, respectively.
n
X

∂
Uu = − (1 − b)ci φ − bci si + λ
eij −qj (gj )2 + 2qj gj
∂gi
j=1,j6=i


n
X
eij gj  (−2qi gi + 2qi ) .
+ λ 1 +
j=1,j6=i

∂2
∂gi2



n
X

Uu = − 2qi λ 1 +


eij gj  .

j=1,j6=i

∂2
Uu = λeij (−2qj gj + 2qj ) + λeij (−2qi gi + 2qi ) .
∂gi gj
To find the maximum value, we need to solve the following system of equations.


∂


∂g1 Uu = 0;




 ∂ Uu = 0;
∂g2


...





 ∂ U = 0.
∂gn u

(3.6)

All the solutions of the system of equations are the extreme points of user’s utility. To
find the global maximum value, we create the corresponding Hessian matrix:

Hu =

∂2
U
∂g1 2 u

∂2
∂g1 ∂g2 Uu

...

∂2
∂g1 ∂gn Uu

∂2
∂g2 ∂g1 Uu

∂2
U
∂g2 2 u

...

∂2
∂g2 ∂gn Uu

..
.

...

..
.;

∂2
∂gn ∂g2 Uu

...

∂2
U
∂gn 2 u

..
.
∂2
∂gn ∂g1 Uu

.
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The user has a maximum utility only if the matrix is a negative definite matrix. When
either of the following two conditions holds, a matrix is negative definite [55]: (1) all its
eigenvalues are less than 0; and (2) the even order principal minors are larger than 0 and
odd order principal minors are less than 0. In other words, when the Hessian matrix of
the user’s utility function can meet anyone of the above two conditions, the user’s optimal
strategy can be found by solving Eq. (3.6).
We take the scenario where eij = 0 for i, j ∈ [1, n] as an illustrative example. In this
scenario, the first-order partial derivative and the second-order partial derivatives of the
utility function are as follows.
∂
Uu = λ (−2qi gi + 2qi ) − (1 − b)ci φ − bci si .
∂gi
∂2
Uu = −2qi λ.
∂gi2
∂2
Uu = 0.
∂gi gj

Then we derive the corresponding Hessian matrix, i.e.,
−2q1 λ
Hu =

0
..
.
0

0

...

0

−2q2 λ ...
..
.
...

0
..
.

0

.

... −2qn λ

Because the even order principal minors are larger than 0 and the odd order principal minors
are less than 0, the matrix Hu is a negative definite matrix. Therefore, the utility function
has a maximum value and the maximum points can be calculated by solving Eq. (3.6), i.e.,

−c1 φ+(φ−s1 )bc1 +2q1 λ


;
 g1 =
2q1 λ




 g2 = −c2 φ+(φ−s2 )bc2 +2q2 λ ;
2q2 λ


...





g = −cn φ+(φ−sn )bcn +2qn λ .
n
2qn λ
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Since gi ∈ [0, 1], the best data release granularity for attribute i is gi∗ = max{min{gi , 1}, 0}.
From the results, to preserve data privacy, the user should decrease the data granularity
gi of attribute i if the platform increases data resale strategy si .
3.3.3

Strategy Analysis of Platform

We can compute the Hessian matrix to analyze the concavity of the platform’s utility
function as follows.

Hp =

∂2
U
∂s1 2 p

∂2
∂s1 ∂s2 Up

...

∂2
∂s1 ∂sn Up

∂2
∂s2 ∂s1 Up

∂2
U
∂s2 2 p

...

∂2
∂s2 ∂sn Up

..
.

...

..
.

∂2
∂sn ∂s2 Up

...

∂2
U
∂sn 2 p

..
.
∂2
∂sn ∂s1 Up

where
∂2
Up = −2l2 gi2
∂si 2

1+

n
X

.

!
eij sj gj

,

j=1,j6=i

and


∂2
Up = −eij gj l1 gi + 2l2 gi2 si − eij gi l1 gj + 2l2 gj2 sj .
∂si ∂gj

The platform has a maximum utility only if the Hessian matrix is a negative definite
matrix that can satisfy either of the following two conditions [55]:
(1) all eigenvalues of Hp are less than 0; and (2) the even order principal minors of Hp are
larger than 0 and odd order principal minors of Hp are less than 0.
If the maximum value exists, we can find the best strategy of the platform by solving
the system of equations as shown below.


∂

 ∂s1 Up = 0;




 ∂ Up = 0;
∂s2


...





 ∂ U = 0.
∂sn p

(3.7)

In Eq. (3.7), we have

∂
Up =bpi gi − 1 +
∂si



n
X

n


X

eij sj gj  l1 gi + 2l2 gi2 si −
eij gi l1 sj gj + l2 (sj gj )2 .

j=1,j6=i

j=1,j6=i
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We use the scenario when eij = 0 (i, j ∈ [0, 1]) as an example for demonstration. In
this scenario, the first-order partial derivative and the second-order partial derivatives of the
utility function are obtained in the following.
∂
Up = bpi gi − l1 gi − 2l2 gi2 si .
∂si
∂2
Up = −2l2 gi2 .
∂si 2
∂2
Up = 0.
∂si ∂gj

Then we derive the Hessian matrix as:
−2l2 g12
Hu =

0
..
.
0

0

...

0

−2l2 g22 ...
..
.
...

0
..
.

0

.

... −2l2 gn2

Because the even order principal minors are larger than 0 and the odd order principal
minors are less than 0, the matrix Hp is a negative definite matrix. Thus, the platform’s
utility function has a maximum value and the maximum points can be calculated by solving
Eq. (3.7), i.e.,


1

s1 = bp2l12−l

g1 ;




 s2 = bp2 −l1 ;
2l2 g2


...





s = bpn −l1 .
n
2l2 gn

As si ∈ [0, 1], the best resale strategy for attribute i is s∗i = max{min{si , 1}, 0}.
According to the above analysis, to avoid too much reputation loss, the platform should
decrease the value of si if the user increases gi . Nevertheless, the granularity of resold data,
si gi , may be increased, bringing a profit increase to the platform. On the other hand, if
the adversary prefers to purchase data rather than eavesdropping (i.e., enhance purchase
probability b to a sufficiently large value), the platform can increase the value of si to earn
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more profit, in which the reputation loss maybe compensated by the payment from the
adversary.
3.3.4

Strategy Analysis of Adversary

To maximize the utility, the adversary has to find the best strategy b∗ . The firstorder partial derivative and the second-order partial derivative of U with respect to b are
respectively calculated by
dUa
= θa
db

n
X

!ζa
si gi

n
X

− θa

!ζa
−

φgi

i=1

i=1

n
X

pi si gi − σ1 (2b − 2) + σ2

i=1

and
d2 Ua
= −2σ1 .
db2

Since

d2 Ua
db2

= −2σ1 < 0, the utility function of the adversary is a concave function,

which means the maximum value is achievable when
solution is

θa
b=

n
P

i=1

ζa
si gi


− θa

n
P

dUa
db

ζa
φgi

i=1

−

= 0. Thus, by setting

n
P
i=1

2σ1

dUa
db

= 0, the

pi si gi + 2σ1 + σ2
.

Because b ∈ [0, 1], the best purchase probability is b∗ = max{min{b, 1}, 0}.
According to the above result, one can find that the purchase probability b is reduced
when the working efficiency of eavesdropping φ and/or data price pi increases. This is
because the adversary prefers to eavesdrop rather than buying data for cost reduction if the
granularity of eavesdropped data is higher than that of the purchased data. However, the
relationship between the adversary’s strategy and the platform’s strategy and the relationship
between the adversary’s strategy and the user’s strategy are not straightforward, because the
purchase probability is also affected by the working efficiency φ, the price pi for attribute i,
the data productivity of the adversary θa , and the data value output elasticities of adversary
ζa . These complicated relationships will be investigated in our simulations.

22
3.4

Simulation
In this section, we study the interactions among the user, the platform, and the ad-

versary via intensive simulations. In this chapter, we assume that the user has multiple
attributes in its dataset. However, in some cases, the user’s dataset has only one attribute.
To provide a detailed simulation result, we study the interactions among three parties in
two scenarios: i) the user has one attribute in its dataset; ii) the user has more than one
attribute in its dataset.
3.4.1

Interactions Among Three Parties with One Attribute

We first discuss the interaction among the three parties when the user’s dataset has
only one attribute, D = {d1 }. We select default settings for the parameters as follows:
The granularity of d1 is g1 = 0.6. The unit privacy cost due to leakage of d1 is c1 = 3.
Based on d1 , the user can get maximum service quality q1 = 50. The convention rate λ of
the user is 0.1. The platform resells d1 by using reselling strategy s1 = 0.6 with the price
p1 = 20. The other parameters in the platform’s utility function are: θp = 15, ζp = 0.6, l1 =
5, l2 = 10, cp = 1. The adversary has a purchase probability b = 0.6 and working efficiency
φ = 0.2. The other parameters in the adversary’s utility function are: σ1 = 1.5, σ2 = 1, σ3 =
1, θa = 15, ζa = 0.6. The value of these parameters are chosen to reveal plain interactions
among three parties.
The simulations that follow depict different strategies by varying certain parameters
from the perspective of each of the three parties.
Simulation Result of User’s Utility and Optimal Strategy The utility and
optimal response of the user are investigated in this subsection. Fig. 3.2 to Fig. 3.4 reveal
the simulation result of the user.
The results of the user’s utility are presented in Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3, from which we
observe that the utility increases at first and then decreases as the granularity increases. The
reason lies in two aspects: (i) when the granularity g1 increases from 0 to a certain value
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(e.g., 3.46 in line s1 = 0.8 of Fig. 3.2 and 3.55 in line b1 = 0.8 of Fig. 3.3), the increase rate
of privacy cost is smaller than that of received service quality, therefore the utility increases;
and (ii) when g1 continues increasing from such a certain value, the increase rate of privacy
cost is larger than that of received service quality, leading to a decrease in the utility. In
fact, such a certain value corresponds to the optimal granularity.
Besides, as shown in Fig. 3.2, the user’s utility Uu decreases as the platform increases
the value of its reselling strategy s1 . This is because when the platform increases the value
of reselling strategy s1 , the granularity of the reselling data increases. That increases user’s
privacy cost, resulting in decreasing of user’s utility.
Furthermore, the user’s utility Uu also decreases as adversary increases its purchase
probability as shown in Fig. 3.3. Because the purchased data of the adversary has a higher
granularity than eavesdropped data, when the adversary increases the probability of purchase
and decreases the probability of eavesdropping, the user has more privacy cost, leading to a
decrease in the user’s utility.
Fig. 3.4 states the optimal strategy of the user. We can see that the user decreases data
granularity if the platform increases the value of reselling strategy s1 . When the platform
increases the value of reselling strategy s1 , the granularity of the reselling data increases,
thus increasing user’s privacy cost. To reduce privacy cost, the user should decrease data
granularity as shown in Fig. 3.4.
Fig. 3.4 also reveals how the user adjusts its strategy when the adversary uses different
strategies. In Fig. 3.4, we can see that the three lines (b1 = 0.4, b1 = 0.6, and b1 = 0.8)
intersect at the point where s1 = φ = 0.2. When s1 = φ, the adversary’s purchased data
has the same data granularity with eavesdropped data, the user has the same privacy cost
no matter what the adversary prefers, purchase or eavesdropping. Thus, the user does not
need to change its data granularity as the adversary change its strategy when s1 = φ.
Fig. 3.4 shows that the user adjusts its strategy according to the adversary’s strategy
as well as the platform’s strategy: (i) the user decreases the granularity of the data as the
adversary decreases the probability of data purchase and increases the probability of eaves-
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dropping when the platform resells data with strategy s1 < φ. (ii) the user decreases the
granularity of the data as the adversary increases the probability of data purchase and decreases the probability of eavesdropping when the platform resells data with strategy s1 > φ.
The reason lies in two aspects: (i) when s1 < φ, the adversary’s eavesdropped data has a
higher granularity than purchased data. Thus, the eavesdropping causes more privacy cost
than data reselling to the user. To decrease privacy cost, the user should decrease the data
granularity if the adversary increases the probability of eavesdropping and decreases the
probability of data purchase.
(ii) On the contrary, when s1 > φ, the adversary’s purchased data has a higher granularity
than eavesdropped data. Thus, the data reselling causes more privacy cost than eavesdropping to the user. To decrease privacy cost, the user should decrease the data granularity
if the adversary decreases the probability of eavesdropping and increases the probability of
data purchase.
Simulation Result of Platform’s Utility and Optimal Strategy We then study
the utility and best response of the platform. The results are shown in Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6.
From Fig. 3.5, we can tell that the platform’s utility increases at first and then decreases
with the increase of reselling strategy S = {s1 }. When s1 increases from 0 to a certain value
(e.g., 13.34 in line g1 = 0.8), the increase rate of the cost is smaller than that of the profit,
resulting in an improvement of utility; however, when s1 continues increasing from such a
certain value, the increase rate of the cost is larger than that of the profit, further reducing
the utility. In other words, there is an optimal value of s1 for the platform to balance the
profit of data resale and cost of reputation loss.
In Fig. 3.5, when the data granularity g1 increases, the granularity of reselling data
increases and brings more profit to the platform, leading to the increase of utility of the
platform.
Fig. 3.6 reveals how the platform adjusts its optimal strategy when the user and adversary choose different strategies. When the user’s granularity increases, the optimal strategy
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of the platform decreases. Both the profit and the reputation loss increase if the user increases granularity. However, the higher profit cannot make up the increased reputation loss.
Thus, the platform should decrease the value of s1 to reduce reputation loss.
Moreover, Fig. 3.6 reveals that the optimal strategy of the platform increases if the
adversary increases its purchase probability b and decreases its eavesdropping probability
1 − b. When the adversary increases the purchase probability b, the expected payment to
the platform increases. Thus, to earn more profit, the platform increases the value of s1 as
the adversary increases the purchase probability b, as shown in Fig. 3.6.
Simulation Result of Adversary’s Optimal Strategy The study of the adversary’s optimal strategy is shown in Fig. 3.7. From this figure, we can see that the optimal
strategy of the adversary decreases as the user increases the granularity g1 or the platform
increases the value of its reselling strategy s1 . When the user increases the granularity g1
or the platform increases the value of its reselling strategy s1 , the granularity of reselling
data increases correspondingly, resulting in the increasing of data’s price. To decrease the
payment, the adversary decreases the probability of data purchase (which also increases the
probability of eavesdropping) when the user increases the granularity g1 , or the platform
increases the value of its reselling strategy s1 as shown in Fig. 3.7.
3.4.2

Interactions Among Three Parties with Multiple Attributes

According the aforementioned analysis, the theoretical optimal strategies of the user
and the platform may not always exist. For computation feasibility, we utilize a parallel
machine learning algorithm termed Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) [56], to find the
quazi-optimal strategies for the user and the platform, which is performed in the following
manner: (i) we run the simulation 100 times; (ii) in each time, each initial strategy and
the update vector in each iteration are randomly generated. and (iii) we use the strategy
which has the largest utility as the final output. The results derived from PSO are consistent
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Application
Retail
Healthcare
Government
Financial

Table 3.1. Extracted strategies
Strategy setting of {Income, Age, Race}
Gr ={0.2, 0.3, 0.4}, Sr ={0.5, 0.7, 0.8}
Gh ={0.3, 0.4, 0.5}, Sh ={0.4, 0.6, 0.7}
Gg ={0.4, 0.5, 0.7}, Sg ={0.3, 0.5, 0.6}
Gf ={0.6, 0.7, 0.8}, Sf ={0.2, 0.4, 0.5}

with that in single attribute scenario, thus validating the simulation result. For more details
about the implementation of PSO, please refer to [57].
We use real datasets as the inputs of the user and platform. More specifically, based
on the privacy survey published by IBM [58] and Data Protection Survey published by
SANA [59], we extract four user’s strategies and four platform’s strategies. As shown in
Table 3.1, Gr , Gh , Gg , and Gf , are the user’s strategies used for Retail applications, Healthcare applications, Government applications, and Financial applications, respectively. Correspondingly, in Table 3.1, Sr , Sh , Sg , and Sf are the strategies of Retail platforms, Healthcare
platforms, Government platforms, and Financial platforms, respectively.
Each extracted strategy contains three data attributes, including income, age, and race.
We set the correlation coefficient between income and age as 0.1, the correlation coefficient
between income and race as 0.01, and the correlation coefficient between age and race as 0.
For the three data attributes, the values of maximum service quality are q1 = 60, q2 = 50,
and q3 = 40, the unit privacy costs are c1 = 15, c2 = 10, and c3 = 5, and the unit data prices
are p1 = 20, p2 = 15, and p3 = 10. The convention rate λ in Eq. (3.2) is 0.1. The other
parameters in the platform’s utility function are: θp = 15, ζp = 0.6, l1 = 5, l2 = 10, and
cp = 1. The adversary has a purchase probability b = 0.6 and working efficiency φ = 0.2.
The other parameters in the adversary’s utility function are: σ1 = 1.5, σ2 = 1, σ3 = 1,
θa = 15, and ζa = 0.6.
The simulations that follow depict different strategies by varying certain parameters
from the perspective of each of the three parties.
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Table 3.2. Strategy simulation setting
Notation
Strategy Setting
G0 , S0
{0.0, 0.1, 0.2}
{0.1, 0.2, 0.3}
G1 , S1
G2 , S2
{0.2, 0.3, 0.4}
G3 , S3
{0.3, 0.4, 0.5}
{0.4, 0.5, 0.6}
G4 , S4
G5 , S5
{0.5, 0.6, 0.7}
{0.6, 0.7, 0.8}
G6 , S6
G7 , S7
{0.7, 0.8, 0.9}
G7 , S7
{0.8, 0.9, 1.0}
Results of User’s Utility and Optimal Strategy The utility and optimal response
of the user are investigated through Fig. 3.8 to Fig. 3.10 in this subsection.
We analyze user’s utility by using real platform’s strategy Sr , Sh , Sg , and Sf and
increasing the granularity of each attribute from G0 to G8 as shown in Table 3.2. The
results of the user’s utility are presented in Fig. 3.8, from which we observe that the utility
increases at first and then decreases as the granularity increases. The reason lies in two
aspects: (i) when the granularity of each attribute in user’s granularity set G increases from
G0 to a certain granularity set (e.g., G6 in line S = Sg ), the increase rate of privacy cost is
smaller than that of received service quality, therefore the user’s utility increases; and (ii)
when the granularity of each attribute in user’s granularity set G continues increasing from
such a certain strategy set, the increase rate of privacy cost is larger than that of received
service quality, leading to a decrease in the utility. In fact, such a certain granularity set
corresponds to the optimal granularity set among granularity sets from G0 to G8 .
Also, as shown in Fig. 3.8, the user’s utility Uu decreases as the platform increases the
value of resale strategy of each attribute from Sr to Sf . This is because when the platform
increases the value of resale strategy, the granularity of the resale data increases, enhancing
user’s privacy cost and reducing user’s utility. In particular, the user can gain a larger utility
when using Financial Application than other applications because Financial Platform resells
user’s data with the lowest granularity.
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The user’s best strategies defending against the platform’s different strategies and adversary’s different strategies are respectively shown in Fig. 3.9 and Fig. 3.10, where each
line indicates the user’s optimal data release granularity for one attribute. The results of
Fig. 3.9 are obtained when the platform uses the strategies s1 = 0.2, s2 = 0.4, and s3 = 0.6.
The results of Fig. 3.10 are obtained when the adversary adopts the data resale strategies
b = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6.
Fig. 3.9 shows that the user decreases data release granularity to protect data privacy as
the platform increases the data resale granularity from S0 to S8 . On the other hand, when the
value of resale strategy is small (e.g., S0 , S1 , S2 ), the user’s optimal release granularity of data
attribute 1 (corresponding to g1 ) is larger than those of attributes 2 and 3 (corresponding
to g2 and g3 , respectively). Since data attribute 1 has the largest service quality value q1 ,
the user can get more profit from submitting data attribute 1, which can compensate the
cost of privacy loss. On the contrary, when the value of resale strategy becomes large (e.g.,
S3 , S4 , S5 , S6 , S7 , S8 ), releasing attribute 1 causes more privacy cost as data attribute 1 has
the largest unit privacy cost c1 . As a result, to reduce privacy cost, the user releases less
information regarding data attribute 1, i.e., the optimal release granularity of attribute 1 is
less than those of other two attributes.
From Fig. 3.10, we can see that the optimal release granularity g1 does not change as
the adversary changes its strategy, and the optimal release granularities g2 and g3 decreases
when the adversary increases the data purchase probability and decreases the eavesdropping
probability.
When the platform resells attribute 1 (i.e., the line corresponds to g1 ), the platform
uses resale strategy s1 = 0.2 that is the same as the working efficiency of eavesdropping φ.
This means the granularity of purchased data and that of eavesdropped data are equal at the
adversary side. Thus, the change of the adversary’s strategy will not affect the user’s utility.
This is the reason why the best release granularity of data attribute 1 does not change when
the adversary changes its strategy b under the scenario s1 = φ as we discussed for Fig. 3.4.
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On the other hand, the adversary can get higher data granularities of attribute 2 and 3
(corresponding to g2 and g3 , respectively) via purchasing rather than eavesdropping because
s2 > φ and s3 > φ. Thus, the data resale from the platform causes more privacy cost than
eavesdropping to the user. As a result, the best data release granularities g2 and g3 decreases
as the adversary increases the data purchase probability and decreases the eavesdropping
probability.
The changes of user’s optimal release strategies in Fig. 3.9 and Fig. 3.10 confirm that
data release strategy is also affected by data diversity (e.g., different data attributes have
different privacy costs and resale prices).
Results of Platform’s Utility and Optimal Strategy Fig. 3.11 reports the results
of the platform’s utility, in which the platform’s strategies are set to be S0 to S8 according
to Table 3.2 with user’s strategy being Gr , Gh , Gg , and Gf as listed in Table 3.1. From
Fig. 3.11, we can tell that the platform’s utility increases at first and then decreases over the
increase of the value of user’s data release granularity, as we discussed for Fig. 3.5. When
the data resale granularity of each attribute increases from the value in S0 to the value in a
certain resale strategy set (e.g., S2 in line G = Gg ), the increase rate of the cost is smaller
than that of the profit, resulting in an improvement of utility to the platform; however, when
the data resale granularity of each attribute continues increasing from the value in such a
certain strategy set, the increase rate of the cost is larger than that of the profit, further
reducing the platform’s utility. In other words, there is an optimal resale strategy set for the
platform to balance the profit of data resale and cost of reputation loss.
Besides, the platform’s utility increases as the user increases the release granularity of
each attribute from Gr to Gf . This is because the platform can get more accurate data and
more resale profit if the user increases the data release granularity. Particularly, the Financial
platform can the highest utility because the user submits data with higher granularity to
the Financial platform than other three platforms.
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The optimal strategy for reselling each data attribute at the platform side are drawn in
Fig. 3.12, from which one can observe that the optimal resale granularity of each attribute
decreases when the corresponding data release granularity rises. Notice that as the data
release granularity of each attribute increases, the growth rate of reputation cost from data
resale becomes larger than the growth rate of the profit from data resale. Therefore, to
reduce reputation cost, the platform decreases the resale granularity of each attribute.
Fig. 3.13 presents the changes of platform’s strategy when the adversary enhances the
purchase probability. We can see that the optimal resale strategy for each attribute increases as the purchase probability is increased (i.e., the eavesdropping probability is reduced). When the adversary increases the probability of purchase (decreases the probability
of eavesdropping), the increase rate of data resale profit is larger than the cost of reputation
loss. Thus, to get more profit, the platform increases the data resale granularity.
In Fig. 3.12 and Fig. 3.13, the value of optimal resale strategy of attribute 1 is higher
than that of other attributes, for which the reasons lie in two aspects: (i) more information
regarding data attribute 1 is released from the user (see Fig. 3.10), indicating that less
obscured data is available for resale; and (ii) the unit price of attribute 1 is larger than those
of other two attributes, implying that more payment can be received by reselling data of
attribute 1. These results reflect the fact that a platform may adopt different resale strategies
for different data attributes due to data diversity.
Simulation Result of Adversary’s Optimal Strategy Fig. 3.14 shows the adversary’s optimal strategy when the user and the platform use the strategies from Table 3.1.
As shown in Fig. 3.14, the adversary decreases the data purchase probability (i.e., increases
the eavesdropping probability) when the user increases the data release granularity of each
attribute in the dataset from Gr to Gf , or the platform increases the data resale strategy of
each attribute in the dataset from Sf to Sr . The increase of data release/resale granularity
will raise the data price, so the adversary need to decreases the data purchase probability to
save cost, which is the same as shown in Fig. 3.7.
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Comparison with Two-Party Game In this subsection, a comparison between our
proposed three-party game and the existing two-party game is performed. According to
current research [13–17], there are two types of platforms in two-party game: (i) trusted
platform that never resells user’s data, and (ii) untrusted platform that resells all collected
data.
Fig. 3.15 and Fig. 3.16 show the user’s utilities and costs, respectively. On one hand,
the user has the highest utility and the lowest cost when the platform is trusted because the
potential privacy risk of data resale is ignored and the privacy cost is underestimated. On the
other hand, the user has the lowest utility and highest cost when the platform is untrusted
because the untrusted platform resells all its collected data and brings more privacy loss to
the user. However, the trusted platform is an ideal model, and the untrusted platform, which
sells off all data is rare in real life. A more realistic model is a platform that chooses the
optimal strategy by balancing the tradeoff between profit and cost. Our three-party game
model, captures the actions of this more realistic model.
From the comparison of platform’s utility in Fig. 3.17, it can be seen that a platform
can get the highest utility by adaptively reselling user’s data; specifically, by adaptively
reselling user’s data, a platform can get more profit than the trusted platform and suffers less
reputation cost than the untrusted platform. This is consistent with the fact that a platform
usually owns the ability to adjust its strategy for enhancing profit, further confirming the
effectiveness of our proposed game model.

3.5

Conclusion
This chapter studies privacy preservation for context-aware services. To provide realistic

optimal strategies for both the user and the platform, we propose a three-party game model
that captures the interactions between any two of the parties: user, platform and adversary.
Interactions include privacy leakage and data resale at the platform side, as well as malicious
attacks at the adversary side. Our solution determines an optimal fine-grained strategy for
the user and platform, so that the user can choose an optimal data granularity to balance
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service quality and privacy leakage and that the platform can choose the optimal reselling
strategy to balance profit and reputation loss. Our model also accounts for the correlations
between multiple data attributes provided by a user.
To find out the best strategy for each party, we conduct a rigorous theoretical analysis.
We also perform simulations using real datasets to validate the effectiveness of our proposed
game model.
In the next chapter, we extend this work to an m-user scenario, where the interconnected
behaviors of the multiple users, the platform, and the adversary become more complex than
the proposed model. This extension will also need to involve another layer of interactions
between the users themselves, further complicating the model.
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Chapter 4

PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR CONTEXT-AWARE SERVICES:
A TWO-LAYER THREE-PARTY GAME MODEL

In this chapter, we extend our work to a more realistic model which considers the interaction between multiple users [60–63], thus providing more practical guidance for context-aware
service users.

4.1

Motivation
We have studied the three party interaction in the previous chapter. However, in most

context-aware services, there are multiple users using a service at the same time. The
current n-player game models (those with n users) [19–24] only consider the interaction
between the users and other parties (either the platform or adversary). They fail to represent
the interaction between asymmetric users, where users have individual privacy protection
expectations. To demonstrate the impact, let us consider a transportation application. A
user is able to get accurate traffic status without submitting any personal information to the
platform, provided other users do submit their information. If multiple users stop submitting
their information, the service quality will decrease, and if no users submit their information,
minimal service can be provided. Thus multiple users must submit their data to provide
enough context to the platform for better quality service.
In this chapter, we design a platform centric two-layer three-party game model to provide
a balanced fine-grained strategy for the platform, while minimizing users’ privacy loss and
maximizing quality of service (shown in Fig. 4.1). To avoid the drawbacks of the existing
work, we need to overcome the following challenges: (i) Interaction among asymmetric users.
Users of the same service have interactions and each user has a different privacy protection
expectation. Thus, the interactions among the users increase the difficulty in addressing the
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Figure 4.1. Two-layer three-party Game model

users’ strategy selection. (ii) Complicated game structure. Users’ strategies are not only
influenced by other users, but also by the platform’s strategy, as well as the adversary’s
strategy. We formulate this by using two game layers for the game model a game among
asymmetric users and a game among users, platform and adversary. (iii) Theoretical analysis
and solution. The complicated game structure and asymmetric users increases the difficulty
to perform a theoretical analysis of Nash equilibrium and determining proper strategies for
users and platforms.
The following methods are implemented to address the above challenges in this chapter.
Firstly, we utilize a quasi-aggregative game model to formulate the interactions between
asymmetric users and utilize a contract model to formulate the interactions between the
platform and adversary. Secondly, based on the proposed two-layer three-party game model,
we analyze the Nash equilibrium to find the proper fine-grained strategies for all users and the
platform. Finally, we perform simulations based on real datasets to validate the theoretical
analysis.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide a privacy protection framework
from the perspective of the platform, since the platform is in the dominate position, as
described above. The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• A platform-centric two-layer three-party game model to capture the interactions among
asymmetric users, and the interactions between users, the platform, and adversary.
This will provide proper guidance for both the users and platforms.
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• The theoretical Nash equilibrium analysis to find the proper fine-grained guidance for
all the asymmetric users and the platform.
• Simulations with real datasets to validate the theoretical analysis and evaluate the
performance of the proposed two-layer three-party game.
The rest of the chapter is organized to introduce the system model in Section 5.3. We analyze
the optimal strategies for asymmetric users and platforms in Section 4.4. Section 5.5 presents
the simulations to validate the theoretical analysis and we conclude the chapter in Section 5.6.
4.2

Preliminary
Let Γ = (π̃i , Si )i∈I denote a non-cooperative, pure strategy game with a finite set of

players I = {1, ..., I}, and finite dimensional strategy sets Si ⊂ RN , si ∈ Si . The joint
Q
strategy set S = i∈I Si , is assumed to be a compact metric space, and payoff functions
π̃i : S → R, i ∈ I , are assumed to be upper semi-continuous. Then the Quasi-Aggregative
Game can be defined as follows.
Definition 2. (Quasi-Aggregative Game) [64] The game Γ = (π̃i , Si )i∈I is a quasiaggregative game with aggregator g : S → R, if there exist continuous functions Fi : R×Si →
R (the shift functions), and σi : S−i → X−i ⊂ R, i ∈ I (the interaction functions) such that
each of the payoff functions i ∈ I can be written:
π̃i = πi (σi (s−i , si ) , si ) ,

(4.1)

g(s) = Fi (σi (s−i ), si )), ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ I .

(4.2)

where πi : X−i × Si → R, and:

Agent i’s best-replies, depend on x−i = σi (s−i ), is given by Ri (x−i ) = arg max πi (x−i , si ) : si ∈ Si .
Theorem 1. The quasi-aggregative game has a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) the
following two assumptions holds.
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Assumption 1. Each of the correspondences Ri : X−i → 2Si is strictly decreasing.
Assumption 2. The shift-function Fi , i ∈ I , all exhibit strictly increasing differences in
x−i and si .
4.3

System Model
In this section, we formulate the interactions between asymmetric users, as well as the

interactions among the three parties and introduce the proposed game model.
4.3.1

Users Model

Assume a set of users N = {1, 2, ..., n} use a client of a platform to get context-based
service. Each user i ∈ N will submit a dataset Di = {di1 , di2 , ..., dim } with m attributes to
the platform. The client has a local privacy protection algorithm installed which satisfies
strict privacy protection standards, such as Local Differential Privacy [7]. Thus, the platform
can only get anonymized data or noise-added data from users.
Even if the client has a privacy protection algorithm installed, the anonymized data or
noise-added data can still leak some information to the platform, the privacy leakage level
depends on the privacy protection setting of the client. Without loss of generality, we define
the privacy protection level of attribute j as δj ∈ [0, 1].
When δj = 1, the platform cannot retrieve any information about users’ attribute j.
When δj = 0, the platform can retrieve all the information about users’ attribute j. To
get statistical result from users, the platform has to set the same ~δ = {δ1 , δ2 , ..., δm } for all
the users [65–68]. According to privacy protection laws, such as General Data Protection
Regulation within the European Union and the European Economic Area, the platform
should use strongest privacy protection strength in the client by default. Thus, the default
setting of privacy protection level vector is ~δ = {1, 1, ..., 1}.
However, by using the strongest privacy protection strength, the platform cannot collect
usable information from users, resulting in worst service quality. Thus, to collect information
from users, the platform has to offer a ~δ with lower privacy protection level.
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Users have the right to accept or reject the platform’s offer ~δ. We define user i’s strategy
for attribute j as aij ∈ [0, 1], which defines the probability of user i accept the privacy leakage
level δj . Therefore, the strategy vector of user i is ~ai = {ai1 , ai2 , ..., aim } and the strategy
vector of all users is ~a = {~
ai , a~j , ..., a~n }.
The service quality depends on the users’ strategy, and one user’s strategy has a marginal
impact on service quality. The service quality of user i received from the platform depends
not only on its strategy ~ai , but also on the strategy of other users ~a−i . Formally, for a specific
privacy protection level, the expected received service quality of user i is determined by the
strategy of user i and other users’ strategy, which can be defined as Qi (~a−i , ~ai ).
Meanwhile, the platform may resell users’ data to an adversary resulting in privacy
loss to the users. Assume each user has a constant privacy cost estimation vector c~i =
{ci1 , ci2 , ..., cim }, where cij defines the privacy cost of attribute j’s privacy leakage. We can
define the total cost estimation of user i as follows:
Ciu (~ai ) =

m
X

cij aij (sj + (1 − δj )) ,

(4.3)

j=1

where sj ≤ δj is privacy leakage level when the platform resells the users’ dataset.
Thus, we can derive the expected utility function of user i as follows.
Uiu (~ai , ~a−i ) = Qi (~a−i , ~ai ) − Ciu (~ai ) .
4.3.2

(4.4)

Platform Model

The quality of service depends upon the number of users that accept the privacy protection level of attributes. For this reason, the platform entices users to accept the offer with
higher privacy leakage level by providing more accurate service quality. We define σj (~a) as
the expected number of users that accept the information leakage level δj for attribute j,
and calculate σj (~a) as
σj (~a) =

n
X
i=1

aij .

(4.5)
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The value of δj reveals the privacy leakage of users’ attribute j and also reveals the
information that can be retrieved by the platform. According to the research of privacy
protection algorithms [65,69,70], the service quality based on attribute j can be defined as a
logarithmic function of privacy leakage level δj , and is affected by the number of users that
accept the privacy leakage level δj as a law of diminishing marginal utility. Therefore, we
can derive that the service quality depends on a single attribute j as
log((1 − δj ) + 1)σjb (~a),

(4.6)

where 0 < b < 1 is the parameter revealing the impact of σjb (~a). The value of b is decided
by the local privacy protection algorithm.
Meanwhile, attribute i and attribute j may have a correlation. Thus, the information
of attribute i not only contributes to the service which is based on attribute i but also
contributes to the service which is based on attribute j, if there is a correlation between
attribute i and j. We define the correlation between attribute i and attribute j as eij .
Therefore, the information of attribute i also contributes to the expected service quality
which is based on attribute j with the correlation coefficient eij . Accordingly, we can define
the total expected service quality Q as
m
m
  X
X
~
Q δ, ~a =
1+
ejk
j=1

!
log((1 − δj ) + 1)σjb (~a).

(4.7)

k=1,k6=j

The collected dataset from users can generate income for the platform. The expected
income form data is also affected by the privacy leakage level ~δ and the number of users who
accept the platform’s offer. According to data aggregation research [71] and the standard
form of Cobb-Douglas production function [47], the expected data value to the platform can
be defined as
m
 
X
~
V δ, ~a = α
(1 − δ)ζj σjb (~a),
p

j=1

(4.8)
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where α is the total value productivity of the platform, and ζ ∈ (0, 1) is the platform’s value
output elasticities of each attribute.
To get extra profit, the platform could sell the collected data to an adversary. The
platform may choose a different privacy leakage level vector ~s = {s1 , s2 , ..., sm } for the resale
dataset. And for each unit of privacy leakage level of attribute j, the platform asks for a price
pj for each user’s data. The price vector of the dataset is defined as p~ = {p1 , p2 , ...pm }, which
is determined in a contract with the adversary. Thus, the total expected price is defined as

P (~s, p~, ~a) =

m
X

pj sj σjb (~a).

(4.9)

j=1

However, the data resale incurs a cost due to reputation loss to the platform. If we
define rj is the unit cost for reselling one user’s attribute j with privacy leakage level sj , we
can derive the expected cost due to reputation loss as
m
X

rj sj σjb (~a).

(4.10)

j=1

Meanwhile, the platform has a constant running cost cp . Thus, the total expected cost
of the platform is
p

C (~s, ~a) =

m
X

rj sj σjb (~a) + cp .

(4.11)

j=1

To sum up, the expected utility of the platform is


 
p ~
~
U δ, ~s, p~, ~a = V δ, ~a + P (~s, p~, ~a) − C p (~s, ~a) .
p

(4.12)

The platform will maximize its utility by achieving a Nash Equilibrium with the users and
adversary.
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4.3.3

Adversary Model

To get users information, the third party can purchase data from the platform. By using
purchased data, the adversary can generate value according to its type γ, where θ is its value
productivity, and γ is its value output elasticities of each attribute. According to data
aggregation research [71] and the standard form of Cobb-Douglas production function [47],
the expected data value to the adversary can be defined as

Vt (~s, ~a) = θ

m
X

sγj σjb (~a).

(4.13)

j=1

Thus, the expected utility function of the third party is
U t ((~p(γ), ~s), ~a) = Vt (~s, ~a) − P ((~p(γ), ~s), ~a) .

4.4

(4.14)

Game Model
In this section, we formulate the problem with a two-layer three-party game and analyze

its Nash Equilibrium.
4.4.1

Aggregative Game Model

In this chapter, we assume users do not exchange information with the other users.
However, each user’s action influences the other users’ utility. With a specific privacy leakage
level ~δ, we can use quasi-aggregative game model to formulate the interactions among users.
To maximize utility, a user chooses a proper privacy leakage level for each attribute.
According to [64], we define the interactions among users as m quasi-aggregative games, e.g.,
Γj = (π̃ij , Ai ), ∀j = 1, 2, ...m, where Ai is user i’s strategy space. The payoff function of each
player in this game can be defined as
π̃ij = Uiju (σij (~a−i ), aij );

(4.15)
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the aggregator can be defined as

gj (~a) = Fij (σij (~a−i ), aij ) = σij (~a−i ) + aij ;

(4.16)

the interaction functions vector can be defined as

σij (~a−i ) =

X

akj .

(4.17)

k∈N,k6=i

User i in the game Γj aims to maximize its utility by properly choosing a strategy vector
a~i such that
a~i = arg max Uiu (~σi (~a−i ), aij ).

(4.18)

aij

According to the property of quasi-aggregative game theory [64], we can derive the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. The game Γu = (π̃i , Ai )i∈N has a PSNE for any privacy leakage level ~δ.
Proof. When the integrated value σ−i increases, user i can get increased payoff. Thus,
user i can increase its payoff by decreasing the value of strategy si . As a result, the bestreply correspondence of user i is strictly decreasing. It is obvious that the shift function
Fi (Eq. 4.16) exhibits strictly increasing differences in x−i and si . According to [64], the
theorem is proved.
4.4.2

Contract Model

The platform makes a contract with the adversary. Assume the adversary announces
its type is γ, γ ∈ (0, 1). The platform provides a menu of contracts {(~p(γ), ~s)} to the
adversary. According to contract theory [72], to incentivize the adversary to accept the
contract designated for him rather than choosing other contracts or refusing any contract, the
menu of contracts should satisfy both the individual rationality condition and the incentive
compatibility condition defined below.
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Condition 1. (Individual Rationality (IR)) A menu of contracts {(~p(γ), ~s)} satisfies the
individual rationality constraints if it yields to the adversary a non-negative payoff, i.e.,
∀γ ∈ (0, 1),
U t (~p(γ), ~s) ≥ 0,

(4.19)

where U t (~p(γ), ~s) is the utility of adversary with type γ.
Condition 2. (Incentive Compatibility (IC)) A menu of contracts {(~p(γ), ~δ)} satisfies the
individual compatibility constraints if the best response for the adversary with type γ is to
choose the contract (~p(γ), ~s) rather than other contracts, i.e., ∀γ, γ̂ ∈ (0, 1),
U t (~p(γ), ~δ) ≥ U t (~p(γ̂), ~s).

(4.20)

Therefore, the objective of the platform is to maximize its utility by properly creating
a menu of contracts. We formalize the optimization problem of the platform as follows.


~
max U δ, ~s, p~(γ), ~a ,
p

{(~
p(γ),~s)}

(4.21)

subject to Condition 1 and 2.
According to the aggregative model and contract model, we can see that the platform
needs to properly choose the privacy leakage level ~δ for all users and create the contract menu
for the adversary to maximize its utility. Therefore, the Nash Equilibrium can be derived
by solving the combined optimization problem:
max
(~δ,{(~p(γ),~s)})



∗
~
U δ, ~s, p~(γ), ~a ,
p

subject to Condition 1 and 2.
where ~a∗ is the PSNE of the aggregative game.

(4.22)
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Table 4.1. Extracted strategies
Application
{Income, Age,
Race}
~
Retail
δ1 ={0.2, 0.3, 0.4}
Healthcare
δ~2 ={0.3, 0.4, 0.5}
δ~3 ={0.4, 0.5, 0.7}
Government
Financial
δ~4 ={0.6, 0.7, 0.8}
4.5

Simulation
In this section, we study the interactions in the proposed two-layer three-party game.

In the simulation, we utilize a parallel machining learning algorithm termed Particle Swarm
Optimization (PSO) [73] to find the optimal strategies for the user and the platform.
4.5.1

Simulation Setting

We use real datasets as the inputs of the user and platform. More specifically, based
on the Data Protection Survey published by SANA [59], we extract four protection levels
for income, age, and race. As shown in Table 4.1, ~δ1 , ~δ2 , ~δ3 , and ~δ4 , are the protection
levels used by Retail platforms, Healthcare platforms, Government platforms, and Financial
platforms, respectively. We set the correlation coefficient between income and age as 0.1,
the correlation coefficient between income and race as 0.01, and the correlation coefficient
between age and race as 0. We also tried the other correlation coefficient values and find out
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that the correlation coefficient is not a key factor. The privacy costs of users have normal
distribution with parameters: µincome = 10, µage = 6, µrace = 2 and σ 2 = 1. The total value
productivity of the platform is α = 6 and the output elasticity is ζ = 0.6. The total value
productivity of the adversary is θ = 8 and the output elasticity is b = 0.6. The reputation
cost for the attributes are rincome = 3, rage = 2,rrace = 1. The value of these parameters are
chosen to reveal plain interactions among three parties. We choose the best strategy from
running the algorithm 100 times, where each run consists of 10,000 iterations.
4.5.2

Users Interaction

Fig. 4.2 shows the utility of user i when it performs different actions under different
privacy protection levels. The x axis is the protection level, where ~δ0 = {0, 0, 0} is the lowest
protection level and ~δ5 = {1, 1, 1} is the highest protection level. ~δ1 to ~δ4 are the increasing
protection levels, as in Table 4.1. The solid red line in Fig. 4.2 shows the utility of user i
when it stays in the Nash Equilibrium, and the dashed green line is when it leaves the Nash
Equilibrium. As we can see, the user’s utility increases at first and then decreases as the
protection level increases. The reason for utility increasing, is that the rate of the user’s
privacy loss decreasing is larger than that of service quality decreasing. However, the user’s
utility decreases after the maximum point, because the rate of service quality decreasing is
larger than that of privacy loss decreasing. User i has utility 0 with the strongest protection
level ~δ5 because the user cannot get any service quality and has no privacy loss. Fig. 4.2 also
shows us that the utility of user i when it stays in NE is higher than that when it leaves NE.
This demonstrates the existence of NE in the aggregative model and that users cannot get
higher utility if they use non-Nash Equilibrium strategies.
4.5.3

Platform Comparison

We compare the proposed platform with a trusted platform and an untrusted platform.
We assume the trusted platform keeps users’ data safe and will not trade the data, while the
untrusted platform sells all its collected data to the adversary.
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As shown in Fig. 4.3, the utility of the proposed platform (solid red line) increases
at first and then decreases as the protection level increases. The utility increases because
the rate of payoff increasing is larger than that of reputation loss increasing and the utility
decreases because the rate of payoff increasing is less that of reputation loss increasing. This
demonstrate the Nash Equilibrium existence of the two-layer three-party game because the
platform cannot increase its utility by simply decreasing the privacy protection level. The
platform needs to balance the tradeoff between payoff (from data collection and selling data)
and reputation loss.
Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4 compare the utility of three types of platforms with different
protection levels and different adversary types, respectively. As shown in Fig. 4.3, the trusted
platform has higher utility than the untrusted platform with protection level ~δ0 to ~δ1 because
the trusted platform has no reputation loss and the selling profit of untrusted platform cannot
make up its reputation loss. The untrusted platform has higher utility than the trusted
platform with protection level ~δ2 to ~δ5 because the payment from selling data can dominate
the reputation loss, thus has more profit than the trusted platform. This explains why the
platforms usually sell users data in real life.
However, the platform does not need to sell all the users’ data to maximize its utility.
From Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4, we can see that the proposed platform in this chapter has the
highest utility because it balances the tradeoff between payoff (from data collection and
selling data) and reputation loss. It will choose a proper protection level and selling strategy
to maximize its utility. Therefore, we can conclude that the proposed framework can provide
balanced strategies for the platform. By using the proposed model, the platform will properly
choose the data selling strategy, thus decreasing users’ privacy loss.

4.6

Conclusion
The use of context-aware services are integrated into the majority of people’s daily lives.

By utilizing these services, one must provide certain private information in order to receive
better outcomes. Users risk leaking private data, as service platforms are sometimes willing

49
to sell this information to a third party, or adversary to gain more profit, thus resulting in
conflicting goals.
This chapter studies the interactions among the three parties by proposing a platformcentric two-layer three party game. In the proposed game model, we theoretically formulate
the behaviors of each party and the interactions among the three parties by using an aggregate game model and contract model. We run simulations with real datasets to validate the
effectiveness of the proposed game model. We show that the proposed model can provide
the proper strategy for the platform to balance the payoff and reputation loss, thus increasing privacy protection of the users. This work will enable platforms, such as Facebook, to
provide quality service and protection to its users, but also provide a means to profit from
a balanced strategy. To further investigate more realistic privacy protection issues, we next
extend this work to a model that considers the influence of temporal data. Therefore, the
users and platform need to consider the privacy protection for not only the current status,
but also previous and future conditions.
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Chapter 5

GAME THEORY BASED PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR
CONTEXT-AWARE SERVICES WITH LONG-TERM TIME SERIES DATA

In this chapter, we investigate the influence of long-term time series data and propose
a three-party Stackelberg game model with consideration of active actions of platform and
adversary.

5.1

Motivation
In context aware services, services providers require accurate personal information from

users. However, users’ information usually changes as time passes. For example, education
information will change after graduation. The income information also changes over time
with promotion or employment changes. That is the reason why some applications want
users to update their personal information periodically. We can define this kind of data
as long-term time-series data. When we consider the long-term time-series data, it is very
different from fixed data because the data value is not only influenced by data granularity
and data accuracy but also influenced by data freshness. The data value will decay as the
time passed which means the fresher data has more value than the older data. There is
a paradox on the time series data update frequency. If a user updates their personal data
frequently, it will submit its data with high data freshness which means more accurate private
information leaked to the platform. On the contrary, if a user refuses upload its information
as its status changes, the service provider cannot provide service with good quality. Thus,
it is very important to set a proper update frequency for each attribute in addition to the
privacy protection level for each update.
Besides, in this kind scenarios, adversaries may not only eavesdrop or purchase users’
submitted data, but also actively request users’ information by sending surveys, advertise-
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ments or giving more reward for specific information. By sending customized mobile advertisements, adversaries can trace a user’s location [74]. There is also a possibility to infer
users’ information from their reaction to different kinds of advertisements [75]. Therefore,
to protect users long-term information, we need to consider the active-attack adversaries.
Many researchers propose different game models to protect users’ privacy with consideration of time-series data [16, 17, 76–84]. However, all the work only focuses on short-term
time series data like location and retail application usage. They investigate the privacy issues from the connection between locations. Different to the short-term time series data, the
data freshness is the key privacy issue of long-term time series data. Besides, all the existing
work only study the optimal defense strategy in two-party game model without considering
the active-attack adversaries.
Therefore, a normal game theory based model cannot be used to formulate the long-term
time-series data based context-aware services. To further investigate more realistic privacy
protection issues, we extend our work to a model that considers the influence of long-term
time-series data and an active-attack adversary.
To design a proper game model to adapt to the scenario with long-term time-series data,
we need to consider the influence that does not exist in a scenario without time-series data
such as data freshness, active-attack adversary, and decision making for each time phase.
(i) Data freshness. The user may consider the data freshness for the long-term time-series
data. The data freshness determines the privacy leakage as well as the service quality. (ii)
Active-attack adversary. We should also care about the feedback for previous time phase from
platform and adversary. The platform and adversary may have different needs of special data
for the future according to the data category they have and the freshness of current data. To
make the game model more practical, we need to consider the dynamic and heterogeneous
reward for different attributes in the dataset from active-attack adversary. (iii) Decision
making for each time phase. Because we consider different time phases in the game model,
the user needs to make a decision for each time phase about the data submission privacy
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protection level. That means we need to find the NE strategy for all the parties for each
time phase.
To solve the above challenges for the scenario with consideration of long-term series data
and active-attack adversaries, we design a three-party Stackelberg game with the following
efforts. (i) We divide time into time slots. In each time slot, to encourage user update fresh
data in current time slot. The adversary can actively choose the data purchase price and
the platform can actively choose the reward for submitted data. (ii) We use the theta decay
formula to take the data freshness into consideration. (iii) The Stackelberg Game model is
utilized to formulate the interaction among user, platform and adversary.
The main contributions are concluded as follows:
• We propose a three-party Stackelberg Game model especially for the long-term time
series data scenario.
• In the proposed game model, we consider the influence of data freshness and active
adversary and platform.
• We utilize machine learning techniques to find the quasi-Nash Equilibrium for the
complex game model and provide insight privacy protection guidance for users.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews and compare existing
works. We introduce the system model in Section 5.3. The optimal strategies for the user
and platform is analyzed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the simulations to validate the
theoretical analysis and we conclude this chapter in Section 5.6.

5.2

Related Work
Many researchers study how time-series data influence the privacy protection strategies

in a game model. Cardenas et al. [76] propose a system to detect electricity theft by using
data from smart meter which is continuously collect users’ electricity usage data. To satisfy
users privacy protection demands, they also propose an algorithm based on game theory to
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decide the proper uploading interval. Rottondi et al. [77] design a Game-theoretic Demand
side management system which uses a decentralized approach for collaboratively scheduling
the usage of domestic electrical appliances. It requires each user to communicate his/her
own energy consumption patterns. By using game theory, the proposed system can decide
the proper amount of added noise and the number of users for the purpose of privacy protection. Tefera and Yang [84] propose a framework to preserve location information privacy
in location-based service applications by considering both historical access data and current
location-based service access scenario, thus determining the probability that the visitors access is honest or not. To protect privacy of mobile users in location-based services, Shokri et
al. [16] propose a Game-theoretic framework to alter users’ real trace based on Stackelberg
Bayesian game. With the purpose of preserving privacy in IoT-based transportation [82],
Sfar et al. proposes a algorithm relying on a game theory model between two party (data
holder and data requester) to reach a compromise between privacy protection and incentive
motivation. Qu et al. [81] design a hybrid privacy-preserving scheme with consideration of
both location and identity privacy to against continuous attacks from a dynamic adversary.
They establish a game-based Markov decision process model to maximize data utility with
high-level privacy protection. Alese et al. [80] propose a game model to protect users location privacy by considering continuous location information from n-users, thus each user can
maximize its location privacy at minimum cost by strategically choosing series of actions in
the game. In [17], Sfar et al. propose a Markov game privacy preserving model for retail
applications. The proposed model considers the privacy leakage issues from diverse components in retail applications and provide detailed states, actions, strategies and transitions
for data holder to balance the tradeoff between privacy protection and incentive motivation
of data requester. In [79], Xiao et al. design a Stackelberg game model to prevent Mobile
crowdsensing server from fake sensing users. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) ensures the smartphone users provide real sensing task with consideration of sensing cost and privacy leakage.
The author utilize deep Q-network to find the NE of the proposed Stackelberg game model.
Pawlick and Zhu [78] model the conflict between machine learning and data obfuscation with
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Figure 5.1. Structure of thee-party Stackelberg game model.
a Stackelberg Game. They also analyze the interaction between N+1 users by considering
the influence of each user’s perturbation. Wang and Zhang [83] study the context privacy
problem in the scenario has dynamic context and malicious adversaries with capabilities of
attacking adjustment. They use a competitive Markov decision process to model the interactive competition between users and adversaries in a long-term defense. The authors also
propose an minimax learning algorithm to calculate the optimal strategies for the users and
prove the propose algorithm can converges to the unique Nash equilibrium point quickly.
However, all the existing work only consider the short-term time series data with passive
third-party (platform or adversary). In this work, we will focus on the scenario of long-term
time-series data with active platform and adversary.

5.3

System Model
In this section, we formulate the interactions between all the three parties with the

consideration of data freshness in the scenario of active-attack adversary.
5.3.1

Framework

In this game model, as shown in Fig. 5.1 we assume there are three parties: user,
platform, adversary. We consider the adversary can actively change the purchase price of
different attributes. That means the adversary can increase the purchase price for needed
attributes.
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The platform can also actively request information and adjust the reward for different
attributes for each time slot. Therefore, the user has to choose a proper data submit/update
strategy to maximize its utility with consideration of data freshness. Because user’s data d
will change as time goes by, the data d may not ”fresh” if the user did not update it after
it changed. We divide time into time slots. The freshness of attributes is decided by how
many time slots has no attributes update, which is defined by ∆.
In this game, we can see that the adversary will choose its strategy first and then the
platform. The user will give response to the adversary and platform’s strategy. Thus, the
adversary is the leader in this game, and the platform is the follower of the adversary and
leader of the user. The user is the follower of the platform. We can use Stackelberg Game
model to formulate the interaction among user, platform and adversary.
In the following sections, we introduce the model of each party according to the order
of play in the Stackelberg Game model.
5.3.2

Adversary Model

As we discussed in former chapters, an adversary can purchase data from platform.
According to Cobb-Douglas production function [47], we can derive the expected value of
the new purchased data for the adversary:
Va = γa (sg)αa .

(5.1)

where s is the platforms selling strategy decides the selling data granularity sg, γa is its
value productivity of the adversary, αa is adversary’s output elasticities of purchased data
granularity of sg.
Due to time passing, the data my not fresh anymore. If the user does not update in one
slot, the adversary can still generate value by using previous collected data as
¯ αa (∆ + 1)βa ,
V¯a = γa (sg)

(5.2)
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where s̄ denotes the last purchased data granularity and and βa is adversary’s output elasticities of ∆.
As time slot increases, the value derived decreases. Thus, the adversary would like to
actively change the purchase price to encourage the platform to request fresh data from
users. The price for one unit data granularity is p, thus purchase price is ps, where s is the
granularity of purchased data from the platform. Then, we can derive the utility function of
the adversary as follows.
Ua = Va − psg.

(5.3)

The adversary will adjust the price p to maximize its utility. We formalize the optimization
problem as follows.
max Ua
p

(5.4)

subject to Ua > V¯a .
.
5.3.3

Platform Model

After the adversary decides the price for the data, the platform may also change its
selling strategy as well as the reward provided to user. The unit granularity reward provided
to the user can be defined as r. The total reward provided to the user will be rg, where g is
the granularity of user submitted granularity. Meanwhile, the platform will provide service
to users according to the submitted data granularity and freshness. The service quality is
determined not only by data granularity, but also by data freshness. The data freshness
will decay as the time goes by. We can define the service quality lose as option theta decay
formulation. Thus, the service quality can be defined as

Q = log(g + 1).

(5.5)
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With increasing time slot, the service quality will decay if there is no new data collected.
The service quality decay can be formulated by using time decay function as

Q̄ = log(ḡ + 1) − θ∆.

(5.6)

The function of θ is decided by the type of the data.
The platform can also get value from the data as well. Similarly, according to CobbDouglas production function [47], the platform can get value from data as
Vp = γp g αp ,

(5.7)

where γp is its value productivity of the platform, αp is platform’s output elasticities of g.
If there is no new data collected from the user, the generated value by using previous
data is
V¯p = γp ḡ αp (∆ + 1)βp ,

(5.8)

where βp is platform’s output elasticities of ∆.
Meanwhile, the platform has reputation loss for selling data to adversary. If c is the unit
reputation loss for selling data, the total reputation loss for selling data is cs. The platform
can also pay unit reward r for submitted data to the user with a total reward rg. Besides,
the platform has a reputation loss because selling user’s data. We use a exponential function
s to formulate the risk of reputation loss.
Thus, the platform has a utility
Up = Vp − rg + psg − s

(5.9)
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As a rational platform, it will choose a proper unit reward r and selling strategy s to
maximize its utility as the following optimization problem.
max Up
s,r

(5.10)

subject to Up > V¯p , and s ≤ g.
.
5.3.4

User Model

The user can get service with quality Q and reward rg from the platform. However, the
user will suffer the joint privacy leakage from both platform and adversary. We define the
unit risk cost of privacy leakage is l, the joint privacy leakage is l(s + g).
Thus, the utility of the user is

Uu = Q + rg − l(s + g)

(5.11)

Thus, the user has to choose a proper submission granularity to maximize its utility as
max Uu
g

(5.12)

subject to Uu > Q̄
5.4

Nash Equilibrium
To find the best strategy for the user, we need to analyze the interaction among the

three parties and find the stable status which is the Nash Equilibrium. Accordingly, the
Nash equilibrium can be defined as
Definition 3. A strategy profile S ∗ = (g ∗ , r∗ , s∗ , p∗ ) is called Nash Equilibrium if the following properties simultaneously hold:
Uu (g ∗ , r∗ , s∗ , p∗ ) ≥ Uu (g, r∗ , s∗ , p∗ ), ∀g ∈ Su ;
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Up (g ∗ , r∗ , s∗ , p∗ ) ≥ Up (g ∗ , r, s, p∗ ), ∀(r, s) ∈ Sp ;
Ua (g ∗ , r∗ , s∗ , p∗ ) ≥ Ua (g ∗ , r∗ , s∗ , p), ∀p ∈ Sa ;
subject to Up∗ > V¯p , Ua∗ > V¯a , and Uu > Q̄, where Su , Sp , Sa are the strategy space of the
user, platform, and adversary.
The Stackelberg Game model can be solved by backward induction. However, for most
parameters of αa , αp , there is no set equation for solving directly, instead we can use machine
learning techniques to find the quasi-NE.

5.5

Simulation
In this section, we study the interactions in the proposed two-layer three-party game.

In the simulation, we utilize a parallel machining learning algorithm termed Particle Swarm
Optimization (PSO) [73] to find the optimal strategies for the user and the platform like
previous chapters.
5.5.1

Simulation Setting

To get a obvious result, we set the productivity of the adversary γa = 4, the adversary’s
output elasticities of purchased data granularity αa = 0.2. We set the productivity of the
platform γp = 6, the platform’s output elasticities of collected data granularity αp = 0.3, and
the parameter  for platform’s risk function is 2. In the simulation, to analyze the influence
of each party’s strategy, we set different value of strategies as p1 = 6, p2 = 4, p3 = 2 and
r1 = 3, r2 = 2, r3 = 1. The values for these parameter is choose to show a legible interaction
among three parties and the existence of NE. For some other values, the NE may not exist.
We choose the best strategy from running the algorithm 100 times, where each run consists
of 10,000 iterations.
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Nash Equilibrium

From the simulation result in Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.3, we can see that there is a strategy
that can lead to maximum utility for both the user and platform. This can demonstrate that
the Nash Equilibrium exists in the proposed game model for the chosen parameters. For a
specific domain, the user, platform, and the adversary can run simulation under different
parameters to analyze the parameter range that can make the existence of NE.
As shown in Fig. 5.2, the platform’s utility increases as the reward increases before the
maximum point (solid dot) and decreases as the reward increases after the maximum point.
The utility increases as the reward increases because the increased reward will encourage
the user to increase the granularity of submitted data. But, if the platform gives too much
reward to the user, the payoff from the collected data cannot make up the paid reward. That
is the reason why the utility decreases as the reward increases after the maximum point. As
shown in Fig. 5.3, the user’ utility increases as the granularity increases before the maximum
point (solid point) and then decreases as the granularity increases. The utility increases as
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the granularity increases because the increased granularity can bring more service quality
and reward. However, a higher granularity can also cause more privacy leakage risk. That
is the reason why the utility decreases with the granularity after the maximum point.
From both Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.3, we can see that for a given strategy of the other two
parties, the platform and the user can find a optimal strategy to get maximum utility. This
validates that the NE exist for certain value of parameter.
5.5.3

Interactions Among Three Parties

Fig. 5.2 reveals the interaction between the adversary and the platform. We can states
that a higher unit price p will encourage the platform increase the reward given to the user.
This is because a higher data granularity will increase the payment from the adversary.
Thus, to pursue more payment, the platform would like to increase the reward to get data
with high granularity.
Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.4 reveals the interaction between the platform and the user. As
shown in Fig. 5.3, the higher reward will increase the utility of the user. Thus, the user is
willing to increase the data granularity to get higher service quality and higher reward. As
shown in Fig. 5.4, the optimal strategy of the user decreases as the platform increases its
selling strategy s. This is because the increased selling strategy of the platform will increase
the risk of privacy leakage. The user has to decrease the data granularity to avoid to much
privacy leakage.
Fig. 5.4 also reveals the indirect interaction between the adversary and the user. We can
tell that, a higher purchase unit price p of the adversary leads to a higher data granularity.
The reason behind the result is a high unit price encourages the platform increase the reward
(as shown in Fig. 5.2), thus encouraging the user to increase the data granularity (as shown
in Fig. 5.3).
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5.5.4

Significance of Three-Party Game Model

To validate the significance of the proposed three party Stackelberg game model, we
calculate the utility of the user in two different scenarios: (i) the user assumes the platform
is malicious and selling all the collected data. (ii) the user assume the platform is honest and
will not sell any collected data. From Fig. 5.5, we can see that the user will choose a higher
granularity (as the solid red dot) for submitted data when it assumes the platform is honest.
When the user assumes the platform is malicious, it will choose to decrease the granularity
(as the solid green diamond) for the submitted data to avoid risk of privacy leakage. However,
in the real world, most of the platforms are the type proposed in the game model. Thus,
neither the optimal strategy (left green circle) when assume the platform is malicious nor
the strategy (right red circle) when assume the platform is honest can make the user get
maximum utility. Therefore, the proposed three-party Stackelberg game model is significant
to guide the user to choose the optimal strategy to protect its privacy.

5.6

Conclusion
In this chapter, we consider the long-term time-series data and formulate the influence of

time decay of data. In this scenario, we assume both the adversary and platform have active
actions to request data. We design a three-party Stackelberg game model to formulate the
interactions among user, platform, and adversary. The machine learning based simulation
validate the proposed game model and the existence of NE. By using the proposed framework,
users can have guidance for whether to submit data for the current time slot and what the
proper granularity should be for the submitted data.
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Chapter 6

FUTURE WORK

In this dissertation, we propose three-party game models for three different general
scenarios. These works provide theoretical guidance for users to protect their privacy while
enjoying context-aware services. To apply the derived theoretical result into specific practical
scenarios, we need to adjust the general structure and formulations to fit in the target
scenario. Furthermore, it is very hard for users to calculate the NE and then choose a
proper action based on the theoretical value. Thus, an AI (Artificial Intelligence) based
Middleware Powered by Game Theory is necessary for users to automatically apply the
theoretical result derived from three-party game model.
Therefore, in the future, we would like to design game model based applications for
specific domains such as Smart Healthcare 85–95, Industry 4.0 [96–106], Big Data [107–119],
Smart City [120–125], Cloud Computing [126–150], Croudsourcing [151–169], Cognitive
Radio Network [170–174], Mobile Network [175–193], Wireless Sensor Network [194–235],
Vehicular Network [236–252], Social Network [253–262], 5G Network [263–270], Smart
City [271–281], BlockChain [282], etc. We also want to build AI based Middlewares to
detect the strategy of platforms (from coupon, survey, advertisement, etc) and adversaries
(from advertisement, fraud messages, etc), thus choosing the proper strategy for users automatically based on the result derived from game model.

6.1

Game Theory Based Application for Specific Domain
With the development of CPS (Cyber-Physical System) [283–288] and IoT (Internet of

Things) [289, 290], context-aware services has been split to diverse specific scenarios such
as Healthcare, Smart City (includes smart grid, water and waste management, traffic and
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transportation management, Cognitive Radio Network, Mobile Network, Wireless Sensor
Network, etc.), Industry 4.0, Retail etc.
As we can see, different scenarios have different type of context and different valuation
functions. Thus, to apply the general framework work, we have to go deeper to investigate
the risk and valuation functions. Because of the importance of people’s health information
and the popularity of health related wearable devices, we will investigate the specific needs
for healthcare domain in our future work. We will study the common context types collected
from users’ wearable devices, the services provided from different kind of platform, and possible attacks from adversaries. Besides, we will also investigate the valuation functions for the
service quality, risk estimation, and data valuation as well as the proper parameters in these
formulations especially for healthcare scenario. Furthermore, according to the interaction in
healthcare service, we may modify one of the proposed general three party game model or
combine them together. We intend to derive a result which can be easily embedded to the
healthcare privacy protection system.

6.2

Privacy Protection Middleware Powered by Game Theory
In this dissertation, we derive the theoretical result of the propose strategy of users.

However, the theoretical result like “set granularity to 0.6” is meaningless for the user.
Thus, there is a gap between the theoretical result derived from this dissertation and real
application. To fill this gap, we would like to build a middleware for context-aware services
by utilizing DL techniques [291]. From the coupon, survey and advertisement sent from the
platform and adversary, we can use DL based keyword detection and image detection to
detect the strategy of the platform and the adversary. Based on the proposed game model,
the algorithm can calculate the proper strategy of the user. We can use fuzzy set to map the
numerical strategy to proper meaningful strategy. As a privacy protector installed in user’s
devices, the middleware will not leak precious information to any platform. Therefore, for
any type of data, it will submit data with proper granularity to data requester with respect
to users’ utility.
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Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, we study the problems of privacy protection for context-aware
services based on game theory. We build three party game models for three different general
scenarios and provide privacy guidance for users accordingly.
Firstly, this dissertation provides realistic optimal strategies for both the user and the
platform. We propose a three-party game model that captures the interactions between any
two of the parties: user, platform and adversary. Our solution determines an optimal finegrained strategy for the user and platform, so that the user can choose an optimal data
granularity to balance service quality and privacy leakage and that the platform can choose
the optimal reselling strategy to balance profit and reputation loss. Our model also accounts
for the correlations between multiple data attributes provided by a user.
Secondly, this dissertation studies the interactions among the three parties by proposing
a platform-centric two-layer three party game. In the proposed game model, we theoretically
formulate the behaviors of each party and the interactions among the three parties by using
an aggregate game model and contract model. This work will enable platforms, such as
Facebook, to provide quality service and protection to its users, but also provide a means to
profit from a balanced strategy.
Thirdly, this dissertation consider the long-term time-series data and formulates the
influence of time decay of data as well as the active action of the platform and adversary.
We design a three-party Stackelberg game model to formulate the interactions among user,
platform, and adversary. By using the proposed framework, users can have guidance for
whether to submit data for current time and what the proper granularity for data submitting.
All the proposed game models and solutions are thoroughly discussed and validated
through simulation. We also discuss some topics for future study in our dissertation. Gen-
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erally, our dissertation provides a body of solutions for the purpose of privacy protection in
diverse context-aware services base on game theory. These solutions could comprehensively
provide guidance for user to choose a proper strategy to preserve privacy while enjoy the
context-aware services. We believe the work in this dissertation will serve as a core of privacy
protection algorithms. Finally, this dissertation will also inspire subsequent research towards
the publication of privacy protection in specific applications.
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